Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 15, Number 1 (June 1977)

Book Review: Sentencing, by Clayton C. Ruby
Alan Grant
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Book Review

Citation Information
Grant, Alan. "Book Review: Sentencing, by Clayton C. Ruby." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 15.1 (1977) : 269-274.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol15/iss1/9

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Article 9

Book Reviews
SENTENCING, CLAYTON C. RUBY, Toronto: Butterworths, 1976. Pp. 537.
($55.00).
This text, to quote the author's preface at page vii, "attempts to canvass
the law of sentencing, but not all cases have been included. The object has
been, where possible, to set out and analyze principles, so that more effective
submissions can be made with a view to assisting the sentencing judge."
It was, therefore, written for the practitioner who, we are informed at
page vii, "keeps a few cases of note tucked away in the back of his mind"
and generally deals with the sentencing aspect of a case more "inadequately
• . . than any other recurring aspect of a criminal trial." Can anyone who
spends a great deal of time in our busy criminal courts honestly disagree with
Mr. Ruby's admittedly depressing assessment of the current state of the art?
Something has to be done about sentencing and it is not just the practitioner
who need feel shame in this connection. The law schools too, must assume
their share of responsibility, for there are still very few specific courses offered
in this area and any assumption that sentencing is covered in other more
general courses such as "general principles of criminal law" or "criminal procedure" is not justified in most law schools. Thus, in the practice of law and
in its teaching, there is a tendency to concentrate upon questions of substantive and procedural law which apply to ten percent of the activity - the
contested trials - while sentencing, which affects most defendants the
majority of the time, is largely ignored. Mr. Ruby's book will, therefore, be
most useful to practitioners and should help to stimulate more Canadian
academic activity in this field.
A criticism of this book could indeed be made of its failure to draw upon
such relevant Canadian material as does exist.' To the small extent that this
book uses text-book references or periodical literature, they are drawn entirely
1 E.g., Hogarth, Sentencing As a Human Process (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1971); Waller, Men Released from Prison (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1974); Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: Criminal
Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1969) - Ouimet Report; Law Reform
Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada), Studies on Sentencing (1974),
Studies on Imprisonment (1976), Fearof Punishment (1976), The Principlesof Sentencing and Dispositions (Working Paper 3 - 1974), Restitution and Compensation (Working Paper 5 - 1974), Fines (Working Paper 6 - 1974), Imprisonment and Release
(Working Paper 11 - 1975); Decore, The Role of the Canadian Courts of Appeal and
the Concept of Uniformity (1964), 6 Crim. L.Q. 324.
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from England or the U.S.A. 2 Had Mr. Ruby not been a Canadian, he might
have been accused of the worst type of academic imperialism. As a Canadian,
he has probably displayed, unwittingly and uncharacteristically, some evidence
of colonialism.
The book can be analyzed as falling into five main parts. Chapters 1 and
2 deal with the general principles of sentencing and their application. Chapters
3 to 8 discuss various procedural topics including the use of the criminal
record and the plea in mitigation. Chapters 9 to 16 cover the various dispositions which a court may make from absolute and conditional discharge
to sentence of death. Chapters 17 to 21 comment upon an assortment of
topics which appear to fall into the category of post-conviction matters, for
example, parole and appeals, and issues which are ancillary to conviction,
such as court orders for forfeiture and restitution. The final part, Chapter 22,
deals with the topic of "range of sentence" and attempts to give some specific
examples of the quantum of sentences being imposed in Canada. It may well
be that this chapter is the most misguided part of the book, since Mr. Ruby,
at page 424, is at pains to point out that the English "tariff" system does not
operate in Canada, stating that, "[flortunately, no appellate court in Canada
has chosen to adopt this system." Dr. John Hogarth's research would seem to
suggest that range of sentence as one factor only in the sentencing decision,
can best be handled by computers. 3 Because the human mind is very poor at
handling a large number of variable factors when making a decision, one can
only hope that the number of random samples selected by Mr. Ruby in this
part of his book does not actively mislead sentencing judges. 4 In any event,
the English "tariff," which implies that for each of the more common categories of crime, it is possible to identify a scale or range within which
sentences (excluding individual measures) will normally fall, has been much
modified in recent years. 5
The part of the book dealing with general principles could be improved
by taking account of modem Canadian scholarship in the field. For example,
Mr. Ruby's revelation that the principal justifications for punishment cannot
always be "wisely blended," per Mackay J.A., in R. v. Willaert,0 and are
often quite contradictory, has already been noted as commonplace. 7
2

E.g., Thomas, Principles of Sentencing (London: Heinemann, 1970); Cross, The
English Sentencing System (2d ed. London: Butterworths, 1975); Cross, Punishment,
Prison and the Public (London: Stevens, 1971); Samuels, The Fine: The Principles,

[1970] Crim. L.R. 201; Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1968); American Friends Service Committee, Struggle for Justice (1st
ed., New York: Hill and Wang, 1971).
3

4

Hogarth, supra, note 1 at 392-93.

See DeBono, The Mechanism of Mind (Penguin Books Ltd.: Harmondsworth,

Middlesex, England, 1971) at 22.
5 Thomas, supra, note 2 at 35 et seq.

6 (1953), 105 C.C.C. 172 at 175 (Ont. C.A.).
7 Weiler, "The Reform of Punishment" in Studies on Sentencing, supra, note 1 at

157: "Sometimes [the justifications for punishment] will conflict, in which case we must
decide which is to be given greater weight in the concrete problem before us. All of this
is terribly familiar within the sentencing process."
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Further, reference to recent Canadian material would have eliminated
the need to go as far back as the English jurist, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen,
for a supporter of retributivism, at least in a limited sense.8 In dealing with
"individual deterrence," reference is made at pages 10 and 11 to "history and
psychological factors" as a basis for scepticism of the success of this justification for punishment. Again, there is current Canadian research to fortify the
position taken in the text.9 Its use would have been much more effective than
a vague reference to "history."
All in all, the general principles portion of the book amounts, at present,
to no more than a brief outline of the vocabulary used in this area of penal
philosophy. If the book is to have a solid future as a principle-based work on
the sentencing system, it will have to be greatly expanded with full use made
of available Canadian research and writing, and more editorial exposition of
how the case law can be drawn together to support or refute our sometimes
hypocritical penological aims.
In the procedural part of the book, there appears to be a glaring error
at page 92 where, following a discussion of s. 500 of the Criminal Code
(which deals with the record of a conviction or dismissal and proof thereof),
we are asked whether this section can be applied to the trial of indictable
offences with a jury or to summary conviction offences. This query is thoroughly superfluous since the Code makes specific reference to the proof of
prior convictions in such cases at ss. 594 and 740 respectively; i.e., each
relevant Part of the Code, viz. XVI, XVII and XXIV, has its own provisions
in this respect. It might be that something could be made to turn on the
argument of the applicability of s. 500 to Parts XVII and XXIV as the provisions in each Part of the Code are not identical, but since neither s. 594 nor
s. 740 receives any mention elsewhere in the book, this could not have been
the issue being pursued.
The vein of inaccuracy in the text continues when we read at page 220
that "a recognizance or an order of probation for a time in excess of the
prescribed statutory period of two years is a nullity." The case cited for this
proposition, R. v. Fisher,'0 accurately reflects the state of the law prior to the
1969 amendments to the Code, but since then it is clear that a probation order
may extend for three years." Thus, although the text accurately reports a
8 "[Retribution] is alive again, for reasons that go right to the heart of our conception of the criminal law." Weiler, id. at 96, and, at 205: "In its practical conclusions
... I largely agree with the proponents of a purely negative theory of retribution, one
which views the claims of justice as simply a restraint on crime control, not a value to
be pursued for its own sake."
See also Walker, Sentencing in a Rational Society (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin
Press, 1969) for a similar defence under the name of "distributive retributivism."
9
Wailer, supra, note I at 205: "Through the use of statistical techniques we have
shown that neither prison [nior parole, in part or in total, are correctionally effective."
See also Law Reform Commission of Canada, Fear of Punishment, supra, note 1.
10 [1964] 3 C.C.C. 37 (Man. C.A.).
"1Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 664(2) (b). The provision for a probation order to be attached to a term of imprisonment or a fine, s. 663(1) (b), no longer
restricts the duration of such an order to 2 years as did its predecessor, s. 638(2) of the
1955 Code.
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decision which was correct at the time it was delivered, subsequent changes
to the CriminalCode have rendered the case, at best, irrelevant and, at worst,
misleading, since one is clearly left with the impression that a probation order
has a statutory life of only two years.
Furthermore, the penalty for theft not exceeding $200.00 is quoted at
page 445 as two years, whereas this now applies only to conviction on indictment; the penalty on summary conviction being six months imprisonment or
a fine of $500.00, or both.12 There are also some minor inaccuracies, for
example, a constant reference to "theft under $200.00" instead of the more
accurate "theft not exceeding $200.00," since the former wrongly excludes
$200.00 from the category being discussed.' 8
There is considerable evidence that this manuscript was prepared in haste
and edited less than scrupulously. Thus we read at page 135, "[c]ounsel may
show that the actual part he [sic] played in the offence was less significant
than that played by others." One would hope so indeed! On the next page
there appears ". . . the court took into consideration 'the precarious financial
and emotional state' of [the accused] at the time of the offence, information
that came to them [sic] by way of a psychiatric outline." A little later, at
page 182, we find, "[w]hile in custody awaiting sentence, a procedure which
should never be followed, the accused was called as a Crown witness against
Warren MacArthur, who was an accomplice in the crime with him." Now it
is clear that the procedure which should never be followed is the calling of
an unsentenced accused to give evidence against accomplices, since it might
look as if there is an advantage to be obtained by that witness depending upon
what evidence he gives. We know that Mr. Ruby is not railing against
prisoners being in custody awaiting sentence since, at page 223, he outlines
a case where such a practice could be justified. As a final example of evidence
of hasty editorial work, I would cite the fact that the selfsame quotation
from R. v. Robinson14 appears at page 44, then again at page 56, all in the
same chapter. Repetition for emphasis is one thing, but there is a general
S.C. 1974-75, c. 93, s. 25 and Code, s. 722(1).
31Text at 65, 223 and 445. This is just a small example, but inaccuracies abound
in this work which will have to be put right in any subsequent edition. There are, for
instance, citation errors at 166 where the well-known English cases of Birtles and Macro
appear as Dirtless and Marco respectively, at 161 "(Alta. Dist. Ct.)" appears as "(Man.
Dist. Ct.)" in footnote 103, and at 143 where footnote 38 refers us, inexplicably, to
page 193. There are also a host of typographical errors of which the following are
merely representative: "liason" for "liaison", "eminance" for "eminence" (both at 5),
"disaproportionate" for "disproportionate" (at 23), "injustifiably" for "unjustifiably" (at
29), "court" for "count" (at 50), "habeaus corpus" for "habeas corpus" (at 64),
"Juvenile Delinquency Act" for "Juvenile Delinquents Act" (at 71), "not" for "nor"
and the word "they" missing (at 98), "excepted" for "expected" (at 106), "substaining"
for "sustaining" (at 129), "dependents" for "dependants" (at 179), "(B.C.S.A.)" for
"(B.C.S.C.)" (at 220 in footnote 55), "pleased" for "pleaded" (at 237), "devided" for
"decided" (at 424), "s. 249" for "s. 294" (at 445). This last error has the consequent
effect of removing "theft" from the Table of Criminal Code Sections at 529 so that one
of our commonest of offences is not represented there. There are many other similar
inaccuracies which I shall refrain from identifying. The point, I feel, has been made.
'4 (1969), 53 Cr. App. R. 314.
12
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absence of cross-reference throughout the book which, on some occasions, is
irritating, but on others is actually misleading.
One of the clearest cases of a failure to cross-reference occurs when the
author is dealing with the effect of an absolute discharge. Pages 186-87 leave
the impression that a discharge does not result in a criminal record, whereas
pages 198-99 make it perfectly clear that the advantage obtained by the
accused is that he may have his record of discharge expunged more quickly
under the pardoning procedures. It is, of course, unfortunate that Canada
chose this rather self-defeating method of dealing with the discharge provision,
but this book, by quoting R. v. McInnis" to the effect that the clear purpose
of the legislation was to enable a court to avoid ascribing a criminal record
to an accused, without at the same time mentioning the effect of the Criminal
Records Act,' will mislead many who do not read on to pages 198-99 at the
same sitting.
Another example of the lack of cross-reference occurs at page 199 where
the author deals with the question of the availability of discharges for provincial offences. Here Mr. Ruby throws doubt upon a Nova Scotia decision 7
which declined to make such an application and properly draws our attention
to the "incorporation by reference" argument that provincial summary conviction legislation, if it applies Part XXIV of the CriminalCode to such summary conviction proceedings, might be said to have made s. 720 of the Code
available (within which the definition of "sentence" includes the discharge
provision). However, at page 221, we learn that under The ProbationAct 18
of Ontario, for example, a person may be put on probation without being
convicted [emphasis added]. Now surely, whatever the merits of the incorporation by reference argument may be, here is a method whereby if a
judge is so minded, the "benefits" of the absolute discharge can be obtained
within purely provincial legislative authority. 19 The failure to mention this
expressly in the earlier section is bound to mislead those who are led to
believe that the availability of an effective discharge without conviction can
only be sustained, if at all, by applying s. 662.1 to provincial summary conviction offences.
Another matter for criticism is the fact that many of the chapters contain
very long verbatim and unannotated quotations from the Criminal Code and
other federal legislation. For instance, Chapter 12 on "Costs" contains three
and one half pages of direct quotations and less than two pages of commentary, Chapters 10 and 11 have four and six and one quarter pages of
legislative quotations respectively and Chapter 16, "Sentence of Death," is
totally made up of such reproduced material. This is a very expensive way
indeed, of buying a piece of legislation!
15 (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 471 (Ont. C.A.).
16 R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 12 as am. by S.C. 1972, c. 13, s. 72.
7
1 R. v. Gower (1973), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 543 (N.S. Co. Ct.).
18 R.S.O. 1970, c. 364, s. 5(1).
19 Indeed, since there is no finding of guilt there would not even be a "record,"
an added advantage to an accused.
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The index also leaves much to be desired, comprising a mere seven pages
and containing none of the headings in the table of contents which itself comprises nine pages. Since the table of contents appears in the order in which
the book is written, and not alphabetically, it would clearly have been better
to have had all of the table of contents headings filed alphabetically in the
index. If this had been done, some of the problems caused by the lack of
cross-referencing in the book would have come immediately to the author's
notice, and both the index and the content of the book might thereby have
been improved.
On the positive side, the book offers a great deal. In a recent sentencing
seminar at Osgoode Hall Law School, 20 seven students were asked to affix an
appropriate sentence upon an accused in a given fact situation where the
students were privy to the submissions for the Crown and the defence following a plea of guilty to theft exceeding $200.00. It was fully expected that the
range of sentence which would be imposed would vary widely as between the
seven student "judges," and this, in fact, was the case. What was surprising,
however, was that four out of the seven students gave a disposition which was
illegal; i.e., the mixture of definite and indefinite sentence and the combination
of imprisonment, fine and probation were such that they would have been null
and void. In short, sentencing involves not only the problem of quantum, but
also the technical difficulty of complying with the various provisions of the
Criminal Code and other relevant statutes.

Mr. Ruby's book does an excellent job of unravelling some of the difficulties involved in combining available dispositions, for example, the effect
of s. 646(2) and differences in the consequences of making dispositions under
s. 663 (1) (a) (b) and (c). If it should be thought that the above example
showing the difficulties which law students have in composing legal sentences
would not apply to judges in the "real world," there
is some recent Canadian
21
scholarship which should disabuse any such belief.
Sentencing law is difficult and technical. Mr. Ruby's book is one step
towards clarifying some of the issues. This is the most onerous job which
society gives to the judiciary. Any attempt to help improve the legality and
propriety of dispositions should not be lightly scorned. This book is a modest
beginning and Mr. Ruby and his collaborators are to be congratulated for
their courage in making the first move. It behooves the rest of us to offer our
assistance in improving it, to write a better one, or to maintain a modest silence.
It is clear, however, that Canada's definitive book on "Sentencing" has not
yet been written.
By
20
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